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Abstract.
Social evolution theory provides a wide array of successful evolutionary ex-
planations for cooperative traits. However and surprisingly, a number of cases of
unexplained cooperative behaviour remain. Shouldn’t they cast doubt on the re-
levance of the theory, or even disconfirm it? This depends on whether the theory
is akin to a research programme such as adaptationism, or closer to a theory – a
set of compatible, (dis)confirmable hypotheses. In order to find out, we focus on
the two main tenets of social evolution theory, namely reciprocity explanations and
kin selection. Reciprocity-based explanations are extremely hard to (dis)confirm.
This is due, first to the multiple realisability of explanatory processes, factors and
strategies, despite apparent reasons to the contrary; second, to the high quantity,
and limited availability of data needed to eliminate or back up such explanations.
One of our target cases vividly illustrates these limitations. Moreover, kin selection,
while relatively easy to disconfirm in particular cases, seems to enjoy a more limited
explanatory scope than previously thought. Overall, social evolution theory turns
out to be neither a research programme nor a theory, but a heterogeneous scientific
entity, composed of parts that are amenable to (dis)confirmation and others barely
so.
1. Introduction
About sixty years ago, there was no social evolution theory. Coopera-
tive traits – behavioural traits such their bearers benefits when they
interact – and among them, altruistic traits in particular – beneficial
to others but costly to their bearers – had received no satisfying expla-
nation. Nowadays though, social evolution theory is thriving. Within
In particular, among social behaviours, countless cases of cooperative
behaviours may now be explained in terms of kin selection, direct or
indirect reciprocity, group selection, greenbeards, lateral gene transfer,
about which recent works abound.1 Even the fair number of contro-
versies it recently witnessed have displayed its good health rather than
threatened it (as we will see).
All this is well known. It may thus come as a surprise that there are
cases unexplained cooperative behaviours – instances of cooperation
that are problematic given the existing theoretical background. In this
1 See for instance, only in the last decade or so: Tomasello 2009, Bourke 2011,
Gintis & Bowles 2011, Sterelny et al. 2013, Marshall 2015, Birch 2017.
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paper, we aim, first, to describe and characterise these cases, and second
to assess their consequences for social evolution theory. Do they point
to possible shortcomings of social evolution theory or are they just cases
awaiting theoretical integration?
Depending on the answer to this question, consequences can then
be drawn about social evolution theory itself. It may, not unlike adap-
tationism itself, not be amenable to (dis)confirmation and so not be
threatened by problematic sense. If, however, it is more similar to a
theory, that is, to a set of testable hypotheses, then such cases may
prove worrying. As we will see, there are reasons to doubt both views
and to see social evolution theory as a heterogeneous scientific en-
tity, confirmation-wise: although some of its parts are vulnerable to
empirical counterexamples, others hardly are.
Our argument unfolds as follows. Section 2 recalls the main featu-
res and the explanatory success of social evolution theory. Section 3
describes four cases of problematic, unexplained cooperative behavi-
our and identifies their common features – namely that they escape
kin selection and are only speculatively compatible with reciprocity-
based explanations. Section 4 discusses reasons why social evolution
theory may be thought as vulnerable to empirical counterexamples in
principle, in contrast to adaptationism in general. The following two
sections then discuss the main two tenets of social evolution theory
and pave the way for our final diagnosis. Section 5 discusses in detail
one particular case of cooperative behaviour (cooperative courtship in
long-tailed manakins), which helps highlight how difficult confirming
or disconfirming reciprocity-based explanations is. Section 6 focuses on
kin selection, which, though empirically vulnerable, has seen its expla-
natory scope threatened. As a consequence, the relative scope of–and
problems associated with–reciprocity explanations increase. Section 7
then clarifies the status of social evolution theory from a confirmatory
perspective. After discussing what makes it different from both a rese-
arch programme and a theory, we will argue that it is neither. Social
evolution theory should be seen as a heterogeneous unit, a confirmatory
patchwork. Overall, the existence of cooperative behaviours for which
we do not yet have explanations is not a sign of weakness.
2. Social evolution theory
The purpose of social evolution theory is to explain the evolution of
social traits, that is, traits that are beneficial or costly to individuals
other than their bearer. It mostly focuses on cooperative ones. Coope-
ration refers to behavioural traits from which their bearers benefit
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when they interact. Among cooperative traits, mutualistic traits are
beneficial both to their bearers and to others. By contrast, altruistic
traits benefit others but are costly for their bearer.2 Accordingly, the
main purpose of the theory is to solve the problem of cooperation posed
by the latter traits, which can be formulated in this way: why should
a behavioural trait that benefits others but is potentially costly to its
bearer be enhanced by natural selection?
Rather than a unified theory, social evolution theory is best un-
derstood a set of distinct explanatory principles, such as kin selection
(Hamilton 1964), group selection in its ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms (Wynne-
Edwards 1962, Wilson 1975, Maynard-Smith 1976), direct and indirect
reciprocity (Trivers 1971, Alexander 1987) as well as other mechanisms
such as green beards (Dawkins 1976, Gardner & West 2009) and lateral
gene transfer (Birch 2014).3 These principles may in turn lead to one or
several more specific hypotheses regarding any given cooperative trait.
At the highest level of abstraction, all explanations of cooperative
behaviour share one property: they involve positive assortment (Flet-
cher & Doebeli 2009; though there may be rare conceptual exceptions,
as suggested by Archetti & Scheuring 2012). In all existing explanati-
ons, cooperators end up more likely to interact with other cooperators
for one reason or another; and as a result, cooperators benefit more
from cooperative efforts than non-cooperators do. So we could say there
is only one general explanatory scheme for cooperative behaviour-one
explanans for one explanandum. However, this would be overselling the
simplicity of the theory. For each explanatory principle can in turn be
individuated at a finer grain–it is compatible with various mechanisms,
which are multiply realisable (as we will see below in section 4.2). Even
if cooperators always need to preferentially interact with other coope-
rators for cooperation to evolve, the ways in which this preferential
interaction is realised, and the various characteristics of what counts
as a cooperative agent, make the explanatory principles quite distinct.
Moreover, as we will also see, the various principles do not behave
similarly when it comes to the search for possibly conflicting evidence.
Overall, SET is a strange, layered beast: a set of explanatory principles,
each of which may allow for numerous specific hypotheses regarding the
evolution of a cooperation trait.
2 Here and throughout this paper, benefits and costs are to be understood in
terms of biological fitness, as is customary in evolutionary biology. Additional rele-
vant social traits are spiteful and egoistic traits, which are costly for other individuals
and respectively costly or beneficial for the bearer.
3 A number of these principles are often called theories as well, e.g. kin selection
theory of reciprocity theory. However, to avoid confusion, throughout this paper we
reserve the term ‘theory’ to SET.
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All explanatory principles for cooperative behaviour share another
feature though: they do not solve the problem of altruism, but rather
dissolve it: what appears individually costly at first sight turns out to
be beneficial in some way. For instance, in kin selection, apparently al-
truistic behaviour actually furthers the spread of altruistic genes shared
by the individual’s parents–individual fitness costs are compensated by
fitness benefits of genetically similar individuals. In reciprocity theories,
one’s apparent fitness cost turns out to be illusory when considered in
the long term, when additional benefits accrue. All explanations of
cooperative behaviour similarly identify hidden fitness benefits4 that
compensate for the apparent individual costs, one way or another.
The success of this explanatory strategy has been nothing short of
striking. SET has displayed great flexibility and proved able to integrate
new factors associated and correlated with cooperation or by taking
into account new kinds of agents. As far as we know, most apparently
problematic or surprising factors associated with cooperative behavi-
ours have been explained away. Let us briefly mention a few recent
ones. Several possible mechanisms link monogamy with cooperation:
kin selection, but also ecological and hormonal factors (Dillard & Wes-
tneat 2016). Aquatic environment has an influence on the evolution of
cooperation and is basically explained by kin selection. It offers one
way in which physical dispersal, which decreases competition between
kin, can be realized (Bourke 2011). When it comes ot agents, social
evolution theory covers cases of cooperation on a lower scale than indi-
viduals, since it explains, for instance, the evolution of the sociality of
sperm cells, bacteria, or transmissible cancer cells. Sperm cooperation
is broadly explainable by kin selection (Foster & Piazzari 2010). Cancer
cell cooperation is explainable by evolutionary transition mechanisms,
which, although the object of much current research, are better and bet-
ter understood (Bourke 2011, Laplane & Germain 2017). Finally, lateral
gene transfer has only recently been recognized as having explanatory
import for the evolution of bacterial sociality (Birch 2014).
In short, so far SET has successfully integrated possibly worrying
cases, which can thus legitimately be seen as mere puzzles, that is,
as solved or solvable through slight extensions or modifications of the
theory.5 These cases typically become part of the regular scientific
activity and do not raise specific explanatory issues. This makes the
4 Which may accrue to various entities, whether they be individuals of the target
population, their genes, groups of them, etc.
5 One may be tempted to call them Kuhnian puzzles, but we do not want to
commit to the view that SET is a paradigm. Similarly, when we talk of anomalies
below, we only mean case that resist integration under any of the explanatory
principles that jointly constitute SET.
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existence of genuinely unexplained cases of cooperation, to which we
now turn, all the more surprising.
3. Unexplained cooperative behaviours
This section introduces four cases of unexplained cooperation, all of
which will share similar features, as we will see.
Like for many other species, the mating system of long-tailed ma-
nakins (Chiroxiphia linearis) involves a courtship period, during which
males, who belong to a hierarchically organised group, sing and dance
in front of females that are visiting their lek arena (the zone control-
led by the group; McDonald & Potts 1994, Trainer et al. 2002). Less
typical is the fact that the court display is always cooperative: two
males actually sing a duet and dance jointly–usually an alpha and a
beta male. Now comes the interesting part: only the alpha males then
proceed to mate with a visiting female, which renders the behaviour
of the beta male puzzling. Moreover, beta males assist alpha males
for long periods–up to ten years. Alpha and beta males are usually
unrelated; and possible direct future benefits that accrue to the beta
male are difficult to identify. McDonald & Potts (1994) mention four
(related) such possible benefits: beta males may still sometimes mate
with females, although rarely; they may succeed the alpha male when
needed (which increases their mating prospects); females may exhibit
fidelity to a lek arena even when alpha males change; and beta males
may contribute to the high reputation of such an arena. However, whet-
her such benefits are sufficient for the assisting courtship behaviour to
become an adaptation, especially given the delay they involve, remains
unclear.6.
Meerkats (Suricata suricatta) live in groups of up to 25 individuals,
with a dominant female. Like many other social species, they raise
their pups cooperatively: pups can be fed by any female member of the
group. In similar species, cooperative rearing is usually performed by
family members, and is thus explained by kin selection. However, in
the case of meerkats, the level of rearing help is not correlated with
the helper’s degree of kinship with the pups (Clutton-Brock et al.
2001), unlike in other species such as naked mole-rats or brown hyenas.
Here, a typically explainable behaviour turns out to be explanatorily
puzzling. However, an alternative hypothesis to kin selection is possible.
Group augmentation could explain cooperative rearing in the absence
of kinship, or could work in combination with kin selection (Kokko
6 But see Edelman & McDonald 2014, discussed in section 7.
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et al., 2001). This might explain why individuals have an increased
fitness in larger groups. For example, in meerkats, the larger the group
size, the higher the fitness, as this helps to protect the group from
predation (Kingma et al. 2014). The group augmentation hypothesis
may be based on mutual benefits, or on reciprocity mechanisms.
In Stillwater, Oklahoma, American crows (Corvus brachyrhynchos)
manifest unusual breeding behaviours–they typically delay their re-
production despite the abundance of partners and of available nesting
spots–and dispersion patterns–unrelated crows often circulate between
nests in order to participate in cooperative breeding (Caffrey & Pe-
terson 2015). Moreover, these nest immigrants are easily accepted and
trigger little aggressive reactions. Here again, kin selection offers no
explanation; neither do reciprocity theories. Furthermore, many of Em-
len’s (1995) predictions, based in part on kin selection, do not apply
well to the observations made by Caffrey and Peterson. For instance,
contrary to one prediction, sexual aggressions did not occur more fre-
quently in groups of non-relatives than in group of relatives. Concerning
breeding behaviours, potential benefits are elusive, such as that of get-
ting to know ones territory or potential future partners better, and it
is difficult to see how they could counterbalance the fitness loss caused
by years without reproduction.
Common warthogs (Phacochoerus africanus) too are cooperative
breeders. However, far from being systematic, their breeding behaviour
is highly variable (White & Cameron 2011). Some females raise their
pups in isolation, others in groups; babysitting, adoption and non-
offspring nursing behaviours are sometimes observed and sometimes
not. Moreover, such breeding strategies seem context-dependent; for
instance they appear to vary with the individual’s age and with seasonal
differences. Here again, kin selection explanations are not available, and
reciprocity mechanisms remain tentative.
These four examples do not exhaust all cases of unexplained non-
human cooperative behaviours.7 However, these share a number of
interesting features. First, they concern widespread traits in non-human
animals, namely courtship displays and breeding. Second, none of them
appear to involve kin selection, although it has long been considered
as explaining most cases of cooperative breeding in vertebrates, for
instance.8 Third, all feature speculative scenarios of reciprocity-based
7 Such puzzling cases may be multiplied: the cooperative hunting behaviour of
Malagasy fossas, which are otherwise solitary carnivores (Bekoff et al. 1984, Lührs
& Dammhahn 2010); the collective suicidal punishment of leaf-cutting ants (Rissing
et al. 1996); the pheromone-based recruitment of Cataglyphis floricola ants, which
is unique among an otherwise non-recruiting genus.
8 Mumme (1992) provides a famous example.
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mechanisms with little empirical support. Indeed, reciprocity (often
in its direct version) is the most widespread fall-back explanation for
cooperative breeding when kin selection does not work (Clutton-Brock
2002). Overall, these case of unexplained cooperative behaviour do
not appear too deeply problematic. Is this reaction (or lack thereof)
legitimate?
4. The possibility of disconfirmation
4.1. Social evolution theory and adaptationism
We have presented a number of examples of cooperative behaviour,
none of which is properly explained by social evolution theory (SET).
All escape kin selection, and all are thought to be possibly captured
by reciprocity-based explanations, the details and plausibility of which
remain speculative. What are we to make of them? Should we see
them as superficially problematic, which we should expect to be solved
by SET reasonably soon, or as worrying cases that may threaten the
explanatory scope of SET?
The former option seems to be favoured by the authors of the studies
described in section 2, for whom our cases hardly qualify even as would-
be anomalies, and who do not raise any negative conclusion regarding
SET. Rather, they introduce speculative explanations, discuss their
plausibility and shortcomings, but without drawing general consequen-
ces for our traditional understanding of cooperative traits. Our cases
are just not seen as threatening the usual explanatory framework.9
Rather, they are considered as intriguing cases to be solved. What we
want to ask is whether it should be so, or whether social evolution
theory is so entrenched that little doubt about it may emerge at all.
This problem may be deemed as too cliché in philosophy of biology to
deserve attention. Since the early days of the theory of natural selection,
adaptationist hypotheses have been criticised for being difficult or even
impossible to falsify (Gould & Lewontin 1979). So maybe our cases of
unexplained cooperation may not constitute anomalies for the simple
reason that anomalies regarding adaptationist hypotheses, although
9 Of course, it would be unreasonable to claim that none of our cases is deeply
worrying or has reached the status of an anomaly, for they are too recent. Our point
is that they do not even seem to appear as would-be anomalies. Still, whether they
could become collectively worrying, when taken together with the additional cases
mentioned in footnote 7 above, remains speculative. As the examples are scattered
across species, journals and years, they may simply never have been brought together
by anyone.
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possible in principle, are rare to begin with.10. The non-problematic
status of yet unexplained cooperative behaviours would stem from its
endorsement of an adaptationist perspective.
This characterisation of adaptationism turns on a straightforward
distinction regarding the nature of a theory. Some scientific theories are
sets of specific, testable hypotheses and as such are open to (dis)confir-
mation. Other theories are research programmes (Lakatos 1970), which
involve a theoretical core that is impervious to (dis)confirmation and a
set of auxiliary hypotheses that may be modified or abandoned on empi-
rical grounds. One possible defence of SET against worrying cases could
just argue that just like adaptationism, it is a research programme, that
is, an entity that cannot be (dis)confirmed but rather judged according
to its explanatory scope or problem-solving success rate (for instance).
However, the claim that SET is impervious to (dis)confirmation,
or at least as impervious as adaptationism itself is, neglects at least
three peculiarities of social evolution theory. First, SET targets one
kind of phenomenon as its explanandum, namely social traits – those
that affect fitnesses of entities, either in a beneficial or a costly way.
Because of this restriction in the range of phenomena to investigate,
we may expect the search for explanatory anomalies to be easier. This
peculiarity is not decisive though, as in principle, adaptationism may
work as a research programme even if it only targeted a handful of
traits, by always refining evolutionary scenarios for their appearance,
and because any research programme has a limited domain. However,
note that our claim is comparative: because the scope of SET is more
restricted than that of adaptationism, it should be easier to investigate
its explanatory success and harder to justify its failures about some
traits by resorting to possible future successes regarding other traits.
Second, as we have also seen, SET is constituted by a finite array
of explanations schemas. As we have seen, there are only so many
evolutionary mechanisms that may explain cooperative behaviours: kin
selection, group selection, direct or indirect reciprocity theories, inte-
racting structures, greenbeards, lateral gene transfer. This means that
for any cooperative trait, there is a small list of usual explanatory sus-
pects to check before we can start labelling it as a problematic case. In
principle, explanatory options for the evolution of a given cooperative
behaviour could thus be browsed and checked exhaustively.11
10 As is well known, there are good reasons to think that adaptationism in itself
is not falsifiable; but adaptationist hypotheses, or at least good ones, are falsifiable
in principle (Sober 2000).
11 This is not to say that the list of candidate explanatory mechanisms cannot
evolve. Indeed, we have witnessed a historical inflation of possible explanations
during the last five or six decades, the last addition to which is lateral gene transfer as
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By contrast, the variety of adaptationist hypotheses that may ex-
plain an arbitrary trait display no such limitations – this absence of
constraint on adaptationist options is indeed what makes adaptatio-
nism a research programme or strategy, rather than a hypothesis that
may be confirmed or disconfirmed. Social evolution theory covers traits
that share specific characteristics, for which only a handful of possi-
ble evolutionary mechanisms may allow. So at first glance, that cases
of unexplained cooperation do not constitute worrying cases is more
puzzling than it would be in the context of adaptationist thinking in
general.
A third reason why we may not want to treat adaptationism and
social evolution theory on a par with regard to their empirical vulnera-
bility is that the latter often targets a type of costly traits12. A common
feature of cooperative traits is that they are also altruistic, that is, they
provide a benefit to others at a personal cost (where benefits and costs
concern fitness). For sure, other cooperative traits–mutualistic ones–
involve no such cost. Still, in social evolution theory, the focus has
historically been (and still is) on seemingly altruistic traits.
Here our point is this: when a trait is costly, natural selection should
tend to make it disappear. As a consequence, that such a trait has rea-
ched fixation or at least has become widespread begs for an explanation.
In such cases, there are good prior reasons to search for adaptationist
hypotheses, because processes other than natural selection (for instance
drift) would be less likely to have efficiently counterbalanced the evolu-
tionary cost of altruistic traits. In short, it is more legitimate to favour
adaptationist hypotheses in the case of costly traits. This is what has
led theorists to keep suggesting adaptive explanations for the evolution
of seemingly crippling traits (typically explained by sexual selection) or
of sexual reproduction (which halves an organism’s fitness as compared
to asexual reproduction; see Ridley 2004, chap. 12). The succession
of hypotheses supposed to explain such traits is thus not a sign of a
loosely constrained research programme, but of a particularly intense
explanatory motivation.
If these three arguments are sound, then SET seems distinct from an
adaptationist-like research programme and closer to being a set of spe-
relevant for bacterial sociality. Note that this does not mean that bacterial sociality
was considered as a worrying case before, because some of it was partially explainable
by other mechanisms (e.g. classical kin or group selection). Moreover, the conceptual
role of lateral gene transfer turns up to be very similar to existing ones; it can even
be formalised similarly to kin selection (that is, using and slightly modifying Price
equation; see Birch 2014b).
12 Among social traits, costly traits include altruistic and spiteful ones–both are
costly to their bearers, and respectively beneficial or costly to others.
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cific hypotheses – a theory – and thus amenable to (dis)confirmation.
As a consequence, the puzzling cooperative traits described in section 2
should indeed be worrying. However, we now turn to reasons why this
is not so.
4.2. The multiple realisability of cooperation processes
As we just saw, social evolution may encounter more anomalies than
adaptationism in general, because of the unicity and frequent evoluti-
onary cost of its explanandum, as well as of the small number and
similarity of its classical explanantia. But does this entail that the
theory of cooperation is likely to face worrying cases? Not quite.
Explanations of cooperation can be divided up in different ways. In
section 2, we saw that the general explanatory scheme of positive assort-
ment can be realised a number of mechanisms (kin selection, reciprocity
theories, etc.). But further subdivisions are possible. Reciprocity-based
explanations include direct and indirect reciprocity mechanisms. Mo-
reover, explanations based on image scoring (Nowak & Sigmund 1998),
biological markets (Noë & Hammerstein 1995) or policing (Frank 1995)
highlight different mechanisms, even if all amount to a kind of recipro-
city. Similarly, there are different kinds of group selection (whether the
traits favoured by selection are possessed by individuals or collectives;
see Okasha 2006), and of kin selection (which can act via subsocial or
semisocial pathways, depending on whether relatives of different or of
identical generations associate; see Bourke 2011).
The subdivision deepens, because any given mechanisms is typically
multiply realisable in concrete situations. For instance, kin selection-
based explanations apply when individuals interact preferentially with
their kin. But how is this preferential interaction realised? Classically,
individuals may be able to recognise their kin (for instance from their
smell, look, etc.); but they may also happen to interact with them due
to some of their specific features (for instance with limited dispersal,
when parents happen to live close to their progeny). Cooperation typi-
cally evolves by indirect reciprocity when individuals recognise coopera-
tive or non-cooperative partners they have never interacted. But such
recognition may be multiply realised: by remembering past observed
interactions between third parties; by detecting hints regarding the
past cooperative or non-cooperative tendencies of possible partners.13
Even given a list of the relevant factors for the evolution of a coope-
rative traits, different combinations of such factors (and of the values of
the parameters that represent them) may typically constitute a prima
13 For instance, song sparrows infer that close individuals are non-cooperators by
listening to their intrusions on a neighbouring territory; see Akcay et al. (2010).
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facie plausible explanans. This is particularly discernable in model
and simulation-based approaches of cooperation, which focus on the
equilibria of evolutionary systems–their possible stable endpoints and
on the formal conditions which allow for the evolution of many traits,
among which cooperative ones. In such approaches, traits can often
evolve for a variety of parameter values (within models) or of relevant
factors (across models). Such results multiply the number of possible
ways in which cooperation may evolve, and so the number of possible
explanations to take into consideration.
Another way to put this point is that any evolutionary explanation
of a given trait is of the historical type; this allows for the crucial
role of contingent, low-probability events. Model-based approaches of
the evolution of cooperation tend to emphasise robust explanations
– explanations which hold for a variety of models, or a variety of
parameter values in a given models, to repeat. But the explanation
of one particular trait does not have to be plausible: truth does not
have to be robust (Woodward 2006). The contingent, local dimen-
sion of evolutionary explanations further increases the list of possible
scenarios.
Finally, the range of possible explanations for a cooperative beha-
viour further increases because of the variety of scales at which the
analysis may focus. A simple behaviour (a single action, say) need
not have evolved in isolation. As rightly emphasised by Birch (2017:
26-8), the target of natural selection may be strategies, or pattern of
behaviours. That is, it may be not a single action but that a sequence
of possible actions (or a way to generate them) that has been selected.
Consider for instance the famous tit-for-tat strategy: here, as with
many strategies in repeated games, it is not the cooperative action
alone that may be selected, but a set of rules saying when to cooperate
and when not depending on what the partner does. As a consequence,
an apparently cooperative action may be explained as being part of a
general strategy; as there are many possible strategies in which a given
action may feature, the set of possibly relevant evolutionary scenarios
further balloons.
Overall, cooperation can evolve from different abstract mechanisms,
which may be realised by different causal processes, concern various
behavioural scales and depend on various factors, which are in turn
multiply realisable and context-dependent. The prima facie limited
number of cooperative traits and of available explanatory schemes only
marginally reduces that of possible specific hypotheses. We now turn
to an example that illustrates the difficulty of empirically confirming
or disconfirming such hypotheses.
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5. Reciprocity: the case of long-tailed manakins
How difficult is it to disconfirm, or even eliminate possible explanations
of a given cooperative behaviour? Let us return to one of the cases
described in section 3 and to a related attempt to confirm a reciprocity-
based explanation, which will reveal how difficult disconfirmation can
be.
The study of long-tailed manakins, Chiroxiphia linearis (Mc Donald
& Potts, 1994), illustrates the difficulty of confirming (and indirectly, of
disconfirming) potential hypotheses. As mentioned above, the behavi-
our of beta males towards alpha males does not appear to be a matter
of kin selection or reciprocity. In order to successfully disqualify the
possible influence of kin selection, the authors conducted genetic tests
on a sample of 33 cooperative males, based on repetitive DNA (more
exactly, polymorphic microsatellite loci). The aim was to measure the
degree of kinship between beta males and alpha males; this was a
relatively feasible task, and kin selection was thus out of the picture.
By contrast, consider a more recent study (Edelman & McMcdonald,
2014) on the same species. The authors study six possible patterns of
interaction for the cooperative behaviours observed among manakins,
four of which end up confirmed, based on: spatial proximity, social
status, the ‘friend of a friend’ effect or triad closure effect, and finally
the persistence of a link. The first pattern involves spatial proximity be-
tween birds: the males who display at neighbouring leks are more likely
to cooperate. Social status may also play a role, since the probability of
cooperating in the courtship increases with social status. The highest
ranked males in the group hierarchy will find partners more easily and
can therefore engage in more courtship parades. The third pattern
corresponds to the fact that two individuals with a common social
partner are more likely to become partners in turn. Finally, pre-existing
and stable relationships appear to promote cooperation between males.
Two other local patterns are also investigated but rejected as irrelevant:
selective mixing (the fact that males could be more likely to cooperate
with individuals of similar status) and preferential attachment by de-
gree (whereby males with many partners for cooperation gain more
cooperative partners).
The authors of this study use a technique called exponential random
graph (ERG) to model and analyse cooperation networks among ma-
nakins. They start by constructing networks of observed interactions in
which individuals are linked whenever they have actually cooperated
in a mutual display. The study took place in Monterverde, Costa Rica,
was described in several prior publications (McDonald 1989, 2010) and
conducted on 139 colour-banded males between 1983 and 1998. The
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data was obtained from 2-year time intervals over this 14-year study
period, for a total of 9288 hours of observation.
The authors then repeatedly generate by computer simulations mo-
del networks in which individual interaction stems from the six possible
factors. They compare the goodness of fit of the model networks with
the actual networks; when high enough, they remove the factor that
least reduces this goodness of fit. The fit is deemed good enough as
long as the similarity with respect to three metrics14 between the ac-
tual and the simulated networks is high enough, that is, whenever the
measured values of the actual network remain between the lowest and
highest bounds obtained in the simulated networks. The fit is good in
this sense until two factors (positive selective mixing and preferential
attachment), but not more, are removed; hence the conclusion that
link formation is ‘largely explained’ by spatial proximity, social status,
triad closure and link persistence, while preferential attachment and
selective mixing, ’[does] not consistently explain the structure of male
cooperation networks’ (Ibid.: 125).
As a preliminary remark, note already that the work, the time to
collect these data, and the sophistication of the tools available to ana-
lyse and interpret them are considerable – in any case, more so that
those involved in the aforementioned exclusion of kin selection.
Another interesting point is that the results of the study crucially
hinge on a specific formal technique, which in turn involves a number of
modelling choices, among which: the sets of plausible factors envisaged
at the outset; the sets of parameters from which the artificial networks
are generated (one set for each relevant factor15); the choice of the si-
milarity metrics; and the criteria on which the actual network-artificial
network fit is deemed good enough. This raises a number of familiar
issues. Different choices may have led to different results. In addition,
it is seldom accepted in the philosophical literature that simulation-
based models can have a confirmatory power16 – so it is difficult to say
that the causal role of the four key factors in the manakin interaction
structure has been confirmed.
Even more importantly for us, the results of the study do not di-
rectly confirm a reciprocity-based explanation of cooperation. Some
14 These measured the distributions of: edgewise shared partners, geodesic dis-
tance (minimal length between nodes) and degree (number of connections). See
Edelman et al. (2014: 127-9) for details.
15 For instance the decay parameters of the network links.
16 Let us be clear that we are not implying that models can be confirmed. Theories
or hypotheses can be (dis)confirmed, and models are tools that may bear on this
confirmation process, for instance by suggesting empirical predictions for a given
hypothesis.
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factors may fit more direct reciprocity (e.g. link persistence) or indirect
reciprocity (e.g. triad closure) scenarios. However, at best the results
establish a number of possibly influential factors for the formation of in-
teraction patterns (in kin selection, there would be only one such factor,
genetic similarity). A full-fledged explanation of cooperative display
among manakins would necessitate at least three more things. First,
a description of the proximal mechanisms by which manakins actually
associate with partners, that is, by which they select closer, higher-
status, and/or long term partners. Second, a full explanation would
necessitate a description of the evolutionary benefits and harms that
are associated with the cooperative behaviours. Edelman et al’s (2014)
discuss possible benefits, although precisely those already mentioned
by McDonald & Potts (1994). So some progress has been made, but
not concerning the payoffs.
Finally, the issue regarding the multiple realisability of each explana-
tion remains. Indeed, even if we assume that local processes of pattern
formation have been identified, it remains to be seen whether they
suffice to explain the precise behaviour of interest (here, cooperative
display). Edelman and his coauthors note that similar processes have
been found at work in the social behaviours of other animal species.
For example, the four factors identified in manakin social structure for-
mation are also important for the formation of human interactions,17;
the two other factors, deemed non-explanatory in the manakin case,
are also thought to be relevant to the human case. Do these latter two
factors (to recall, selective mixing and preferential attachment) explain
the considerable differences between manakin and human sociality?
Does the interaction of these six factors lead to different behaviours in
different species and/or distinct ecological contexts? Other local, yet
unidentified properties may be explanatorily relevant. Relatedly, even
if a reciprocity-based explanation turned out to be true in the manakin
case, it may not be generalised to other cases, even if they involve
the same relevant factors of pattern formation. In other words, hard
work (extensive data collection, detailed observations, further model
building) would be required again to confirm reciprocity-based expla-
nation even in slightly different cases. This multiplies the amount of
work needed for confirming reciprocity theory in general.
Combining our points in this section, and keeping the kin selection
example in mind as a foil, we can see that Edelman et al.’s study
involved a substantively higher quantity of work, the conclusion of
17 As evidence for this claim, Edelman et al. (2014) mention Capocci et al. (2006)
on preferential attachment, Faust (2007) on triad closure, Goodreau et al. (2009) on
triad closure and selective mixing, Preciado et al. (2012) on spatial proximity.
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which is even weaker than the confirmation of a hypothesis. Moreover,
we have no reason to think this would be any easier in a different case.
Now, what holds for confirmation holds for disconfirmation, with an
extra kick. Imagine a tentative to disconfirm reciprocity-based expla-
nations based on a pattern analysis such as above. Two scenarios are
possible. Either one would have to examine with all possible predictive
factors for pattern interaction, which means browsing an open-ended
list; or if any does appear to have some predictive power, to examine
all possibly associated payoff profiles, which are dautingly numerous as
well18. In both cases, such work would be more demanding than the one
just described, as it would require both more data and more analyses.
Though feasible in principle, this is a daring task. Worrying anomalies
will be hard to find indeed.
Overall, SET now appears to be closer to the adaptationist research
programme than it first appeared. Despite its focus on specific, cos-
tly target traits and the small set of explanatory principles on which
it relies, it leaves room for so many explanatory scenarios, and the
(dis)confirmation of each is so demanding, that it is itself hardly ame-
nable to (dis)confirmation as a whole. In other words, in the research
programme–specific hypothesis interval, SET is closer to the former
than we may have thought.19 As a consequence, the puzzling cases emp-
hasised in section 2 constitute scientific business as usual and should
not be considered as threats but as opportunities for SET.
6. Explanatory scopes
So far, our argument regarding the difficulty of disconfirming social
evolution theory can be summarised as follows:
Premise 1: Social evolution theory is a set of various explanatory
principles; so to disconfirm the latter, all of these principles should
be disconfirmed.
2/ Premise 2: It is difficult to disconfirm one of SET’s explanatory
principles, namely reciprocity theory.
3/ Conclusion: SET is difficult to disconfirm.
18 This last scenario seems more plausible, as there will arguably often be at least
a handful of factors with a moderate predictive power.
19 We will see in section 7 why this does not make it a research programme either
though, and that SET may received no such label as a whole.
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From this conclusion, we then argued that SET appears closer to
being a adaptationism-like research programme than to a theory – a
set of specific hypotheses.
Although logically valid (and hopefully sound), the argument may
be criticised because of the irrelevance of its conclusion. For who ever
tries to confirm or disconfirm SET as a whole? What theorists are typi-
cally interested in is trying to (dis)confirm one particular explanatory
principle among those that collectively constitute SET. And it may
not matter much that reciprocity theories are difficult to disconfirm,
especially if they have little explanatory scope and if other explanatory
principles that have a wider scope are easier to disconfirm. In this
section, we focus one one such candidate, namely kin selection, to
counter such potential objections–and so to argue that we are not guilty
of an undue focus on reciprocity theories.
First, how explanatory are reciprocity theories? It has long been
though that their explanatory scope is limited, that is, that they may
only explain a small subset of cooperative behaviours. This is because
reciprocity is cognitively demanding, or at least more demanding than
kin selection for instance. For direct reciprocity to be possible, indivi-
duals need to remember who they interact with and what the nature of
these interactions was. For indirect reciprocity to be possible, individu-
als need to remember who interacted with other individuals either in a
cooperative or non-cooperative manner. In order to identify potential
cooperators or non-cooperators who you have never interacted with,
you need to keep tabs on many individuals. If anything, reciprocity
demands possibly heavy memory resources. As a result, it is thought
to be rare among non-human animals, little of which possess this ability
(Hammerstein 2003); and reciprocity theories would be automatically
disconfirmed when this ability is absent.
Note, however, that such cognitive demands are not to be exagge-
rated. For instance, in an example of indirect reciprocity among song
sparrows (Akçay et al. 2010), individuals become aggressive towards
individuals they have never met when there has been a recent change
of song in the neighbouring territory (indicating a recent change of
ownership following the hostile intrusion of a non-cooperator). Here, in-
direct reciprocity may function without individuals keeping tabs on pre-
cise individuals; detecting changes in an otherwise fixed space structure,
which is less cognitively demanding, is sufficient20.
Even if reciprocity explanations have a slightly wider explanatory
scope than previously thought, relevant cases remain uncommon. Con-
20 Regarding direct reciprocity, also note, as Okasha (2013 [2003] remarks, that
it may also evolve in the absence of abilities for individual recognition “if each
individual interacts with only one or a few other individuals throughout its lifetime”.
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trast it with explanations based on kin selection. One of their attractive
features is that they are easier to disconfirm. For in order to exclude
or at least lower the plausibility of a kin selection mechanism, one only
needs to check the interaction structure: if cooperative partners do not
involve an increased genetic similarity (as compared to the rest of the
population), then kin selection cannot be at work. In particular, there is
no need to go through the enormous list of possible cooperative benefits
and costs. Positive assortment between parents is a necessary condition
for kin selection to act; so the absence of such assortment suffices to
eliminate kin selection from the list of possible explanations.21 So if
SET is difficult to disconfirm, this is not because of its kin selection
component. As SET’s kin selection component is closer to a set of
hypotheses than to a research programme, SET itself may turn out
to be more (dis)confirmable than we claimed, at least if a significant
proportion of social behaviours turn out to be covered by kin selection.
So what about the explanatory scope of kin selection? Kin selection
is typically seen as explaining a wide array of behaviours in domains
ranging from sex allocation to parent-offspring or sibling conflict (Ab-
bot et al. 2010). However, recent debates have cast doubt upon this
impressive explanatory scope. We will mention two of them. First,
one important, well-known consequence of kin selection regarding the
evolution of altruistic behaviour is Hamilton’s rule, namely the equa-
tion stating that such evolution will occur as soon as the individual
fitness cost c is inferior to the fitness benefits b caused by a target
individual for others, weighted by their relatedness r (Hamilton 1964,
Birch 2017)–in short, when rb > c. But this rule can be expressed in
two different ways. As it is described above, it is explanatory but almost
never true: the inequality only guarantees the evolution of an altruistic
behaviour under a number of very restrictive simplifying assumptions.
Now, one may also express a generalised version RB > C, which this
time guarantees such evolution. However, the coefficient B, C and R
are now purely statistical quantities, which can no longer receive a
straightforward causal interpretation (Gardner et al. 2011, Birch &
Okasha 2014). In other words, one core component of kin selection is
either explanatory and almost always false, or always true while having
weak explanatory power. The explanatory scope of kin selection thus
receives a serious blow.22
21 Of course, in order to confirm a kin selection explanation, one would have
both to check the interaction structure and to assess the fitness benefits and costs
involved; for a classic example of such a study, see Mumme 1992.
22 Note that this point does not hinges on the nature regarding the links between
kin and group selection, which as been the topic of other recent discussions. These
typically concern the comparison of the explanatory scopes of kin and group se-
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A second reason to reassess the explanatory scope of kin selection is
that it is no longer clear whether it includes its seminal case, namely
worker sterility in haplodoploid eusocial groups. According to the tra-
ditional analysis, the reason why workers do not lay eggs but care for
their queen’s is that their are more closely related to their sisters than to
their own progeny (their relatedness being 0.75 and 0.5, respectively).
However, relatedness coefficients as high as 0.75 are seldom observed
in eusocial colonies, either because of multiple queens or of multiple
mating partners (Bourke & Franks 1995). One possibility is thus that
kin selection may not be a crucial process for the appearance and stabi-
lity of eusocial colonies but a secondary one, whose efficiency would be
both preceded and favoured by group selection (Wilson & Hölldobler
2005). As colonies tighten up, kin structure may then tend to disappear
entirely (van der Hammen et al. 2002).
Here is not the place to assess these claims. However, they suffice
to show that attributing a wide explanatory scope of kin selection is
debatable for both conceptual and empirical reasons. Consequently, it
would be premature to reject doubts regarding reciprocity theories by
arguing that they constitute but a negligible part of SET. In other
words, while the absolute domain of application of reciprocity theories
is limited (to organisms that possess the required cognitive abilities
or exist in specific conditions), their relative domain within SET isn’t
negligible.
Two final notes. First, the foregoing does not entail that kin selection
may not enjoy some kind of priority over reciprocity theories. When
a behaviour belongs to a type of phenomena thought to fall within
the purview of both theories23, kin selection will probably be tested
first. This is not, however, because it is deemed more explanatory, but
because it is easier to disconfirm. Second, again because kin selection
explanations are easier to disconfirm than alternative (e.g. reciprocity-
based) ones, the relative explanatory scope of such alternatives is likely
to be overestimated, and thus that of kin selection underestimated.
Still, in general intuitions regarding explanatory scope will be too
tentative to draw a priori conclusions regarding the relevance of such
or such principle within SET. The confirmatory difficulties that affect
reciprocity theories thus concern SET as a whole.
lection, and whether one logically entails the other. But even if some kin selection
processes ended up being labelled as cases of group selection, the question of the
relative scope of reciprocity theories would remain unaffected.
23 That is, when it concerns species in which reciprocal altruism is possible to
begin with.
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7. What is social evolution theory?
We are now in a position to assess the nature of social evolution theory.
Is it a theory or a research programme? The foregoing reveals that it
is neither.
First, despite its name, social evolution theory is not a theory. A
theory is usually taken to consist in, or involve a set of hypotheses.
Intuitively, one may thus think that SET fits this description, as it is
based on multiple explanatory principles, each of which may lead to
the formulation of more specific hypotheses in specific cases of social
behaviour. However, the various hypotheses that compose a theory are
in general compatible : they can be and often must be combined in
order to explain or predict observations (consider for instance Newton’s
laws of motion and his law of gravitation). By contrast, SET’s different
explanatory principles generate alternative, competing hypotheses that
aim to explain on their own. In other words, the typical question to
be investigated in SET is whether a given social behaviour is better
explained by kin selection, by reciprocity mechanisms, etc. The debates
concerning the respective explanatory scope of various principles, dis-
cussed in the previous section, bring out this competitive, rather than
complementary, relationship between the principles.24 As a result, if
SET is a theory, it is an uncommon one.
One may thus think that SET is rather a research programme, which
appears to be an orthodox view.25 However, this is far from straig-
htforward. According to Lakatos’ (1970) famous account, a research
programme involves both core and auxiliary hypotheses. The former
are stable and steer the formulation of observable consequences, while
the latter can be reformulated and abandoned depending on how they
fare empirically. If we were to say that SET is a research programme, its
auxiliary hypotheses may be whatever specific hypotheses are derived
from any of its core principles. For instance, within kin selection, an
auxiliary hypothesis may be that interaction between relatives stems
from kin recognition, or from population viscosity (recall section 4.2).
Insofar as the basic mechanisms are multiply realisable, any auxiliary
hypothesis may be equated with a suitable class of similar realisations.
What could be a core hypothesis of SET though? As we saw in
section 6, several candidates have been offered, such as the generalised
version of Hamilton’s rule (Gardner et al. 2011, Birch 2017) or the
24 This does not mean that the principles may not be combined: a social behaviour
may well result from the combined action of kin selection and of a reciprocity
mechanism. This, however, is seldom the default scenario.
25 For instance, according to Birch, “Hamiltons pioneering work kickstarted a
research program now known as social evolution theory” (2018: 4).
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principle of positive assortment (Fletcher & Doebeli 2009). Another
possible candidate may be the Price equation itself, from which the
generalised version of Hamilton’s rule can be derived (Lehtonen 2020).
However, although it may be argued that such candidates provide a
unificatory framework for SET, they must be distinguished from a core
hypothesis. Core hypotheses are supposed to be of heuristic use and to
ultimately lead to the formulation of predictions (in the sense of obser-
vable consequences). Core hypotheses are what allows for a progressive
research programme, which keeps generating empirical hypotheses.
By contrast, the three possible principles just mentioned have hardly
been instrumental in the empirical success of SET. Rather, they have
been put forward a posteriori, and in particular after the main ex-
planatory principles that compose SET have been identified. Positive
assortment, the generalised Hamilton’s rule, the Price equation stem
from attempts to unify a scientific entity, namely SET, that had been
lacking such unification so far.
Couldn’t SET’s conceptual core be the principle natural selection
itself? Not quite. First, this would make SET nothing more than adap-
tationism applied to the domain of social behaviours, which would be
strange given the limited number of explanatory principles on which it
relies (see section 2). Second and more importantly, SET may include
partly non-selective explanations, as noted by Birch (2018: 61). It may
for instance involve drift, as is the case in computer simulation-based
analyses of the evolution of cooperative strategies. The relation between
SET and adaptationism is thus one of partial overlap.
In fact, when asked to identify principles that have led to the for-
mulation of empirical consequences in SET, theoretical biologists tend
to mention one of its explanatory principles–most often kin selection.
For instance, according to Gardner & West (2014):
Clearly, inclusive fitness is not a single hypothesis, but rather represents an
entire programme of research. Scientific hypotheses are judged according
to how amenable they are for empirical testing and how well they resist
attempts at empirical falsification. By contrast, scientific research pro-
grammes are judged according to how well they facilitate the formulation
and testing of hypotheses – that is, stimulating the interplay between
theory and empiricism that drives progress in scientific understanding.
For example, inclusive fitness theory has yielded a number of hypotheses
concerning the factors driving the evolution of insect eusociality [. . . ]
This comment suggests that the ‘research programme’ label may
fit those parts of SET in which core principles play their driving role.
However, this does not entail that the label can be usefully applied to
SET itself.
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What is the upshot of this discussion? Overall, our final descrip-
tion of SET is as follows. SET is captured neither by the ‘theory’
label nor by the ‘research programme’ one. Rather, it is a set of va-
rious parts. Some of these parts may be research programmes (e.g.
kin selection theory), leading to hypotheses that are at least partly
amenable to (dis)confirmation. Other parts, such as reciprocity theory,
lead to hypotheses that more impervious to (dis)confirmation. From
the confirmatory perspective, SET is a heterogeneous scientific entity–
a confirmatory patchwork.26 It is mostly characterised by its domain
– the set of behaviours it targets – than by a conceptual core or by a
shared aspect of its components.
8. Conclusion
How should we assess the consequences of cases of unexplained coope-
rative behaviours for social evolution theory, which is supposed to make
sense of them? Our conclusion is that such cases pose no direct threat.
At first glance, social evolution theory may appear as a set of testa-
ble, specific hypotheses, which are open to (dis)confirmation. This is
because it targets only a specific set of traits and is based on a handful
of explanatory principles.
However, social evolution theory turns out to be quite impervious
to (dis)confirmation. More precisely, while some of its components (e.g.
kin selection) may be easy to (dis)confirm at least, others (e.g. recipro-
city theories) are as impervious to (dis)confirmation as adaptationism
itself is, because of their compatibility with an unrestricted list of evo-
lutionary scenarios.27 As a result, social evolution theory is a confirma-
tory patchwork, whose components fare differently, confirmation-wise.
In the face of yet unexplained cases of cooperative behaviours, social
evolution theory displays no sign of illness.
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